By Lola Record, former intern at Unlock Democracy. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the official position of Unlock Democracy.

A year on from the 2024 election, YouGov’s most recent data show that if a general election were held tomorrow, Reform UK would emerge as the largest party. The past few years have seen a fragmentation of British politics, plummeting levels of trust, and a rapid rise of right-wing populism. Their results reveal that ‘a clear majority would now vote for someone other than the two established main parties of British politics’ with an estimated 26% of voters choosing Reform UK; a ‘striking marker of just how far the fragmentation of the voting public has gone over the past decade’.

This stark finding is corroborated by other polling data, which estimate that over 30% of the electorate currently favour Reform UK, compared to only around 20% supporting Labour, and under 18% favouring the Conservatives. The significant and rapid growth in support for the populist right in the UK raises huge questions about the future electoral prospects of the Labour Party, and more fundamentally about the health of our democratic institutions and political system.

Keir Starmer clearly recognises the ‘very real threat’, admitting that he is worried about ‘populism and nationalism and the politics of the easy answer, the snake oil’.

Labour’s principal proposed solution is ‘delivery’, with the Prime Minister asserting that his ‘personal view is that through delivery, through showing there are progressive, democratic answers to the many challenges we face, is the way forward’.

Labour’s ‘Plan for Change’, presented to Parliament in December 2024, outlined six milestones which they believe will win back support. The first of these is Labour’s central commitment to achieving ‘higher living standards across the country, measured by Real Household Disposable Income per capita’. Starmer argues that making people feel better off will secure support for his party, and thus help repel the rise of the populist right.

However, underneath this alluringly simple solution lies the looming - and hugely consequential - question of whether deliverism actually works. By some measures, real household disposable income marginally increased under the Conservative government of 2019 to 2024, yet this did nothing to prevent the party’s historic election defeat last year. Other indicators paint a different picture of the cost of living, but as Joe Biden found out in the USA, what the spreadsheet says is not always a perfect match for how voters feel. Labour figures would therefore be forgiven for wondering whether, in the face of Reform’s challenge, improved economic performance - itself a tall order - is a safe enough basket for Labour to place its electoral eggs in.

Can delivering on the economy prevent the rise of right-wing populism?

The relationship between objective economic performance and public support for incumbent governments relative to their populist opponents has been widely debated.

There is mixed evidence regarding whether, and to what extent, poor economic conditions facilitate the success of populist parties. As noted by Cena et al., whilst ‘many studies suggest that economic decline can provide fertile ground for right-wing populism’, this relationship is far from clear-cut.

A recent study by the Kiel Institute finds that inflation shocks increase the vote share of populist or extremist parties in subsequent elections, provided that this occurs in the context of below-average real wage growth. They argue that ‘both unexpectedly high inflation and weak economic growth significantly boost the electoral performance of extremist and populist parties’ due to the decline in voters’ purchasing power causing them to switch allegiance.

However, compelling evidence refutes the inverse claim that economic prosperity necessarily leads to the rejection of the radical right, allowing that support for populism ‘can also be motivated by a belief that one's group is better off than other groups and fears that recent gains could be lost’. Mols and Jetten illustrate that populist right-wing parties (PRWPs) ‘can thrive in prosperous conditions’. They cite numerous examples of PRWPs experiencing high levels of support during ‘times of unprecedented economic growth and low levels of unemployment’. One prominent illustration is the Austrian Freedom Party, whose vote share grew from 9.7% to 22.5% between 1986 and 1994, despite Austria’s GDP growing from $98 to $165 billion and unemployment declining from 3.8% to 2.7% during this period. Similarly, Netherland’s List Pim Fortuyn won almost 17% of the vote in 2002, ‘despite the fact that the country had experienced three years of solid GDP growth… and unemployment had dropped to a record low of 2.7%’.

Mols and Jetten corroborate the argument that populist parties can gain high levels of support under prosperous economic conditions with two studies of their own. First, their experimental data reveal that individuals expressed ‘stronger anti-immigrant sentiments when the national economy was presented as prospering rather than contracting’. Second, their analysis of speeches given by right-wing populist leaders who achieved electoral victories during times of economic prosperity found that PRWP leaders can ‘reinterpret’ objective socioeconomic conditions, and promote a populist narrative which presents society as a battleground, undermining trust in meritocracy and instilling a ‘fear of falling behind’. As such, these ‘crafty… leaders are able to turn reality on its head, whereby a situation of objective relative gratification becomes one that is collectively perceived as a situation of relative deprivation for “us”’.

This implies that even if Labour is able to deliver strong economic outcomes (itself a big ‘if’), subjective perceptions of reality - which is what really matters for voting behaviour - may be shaped by populist rhetoric.

How have right-wing populists fared in the UK in light of varying economic conditions?

To interrogate Labour’s strategy to win back support by improving living standards, it is valuable to compare vote intention for populist right parties with mean equivalised household disposable income in the UK over the last ten years.

On their face, Figures 1 and 2 indicate that rising standards of living are no guarantee of depressed support for right-wing populist parties in the UK. Despite a substantial rise in average disposable income between 2014 and 2016, there appeared to be no correlating reduction in public support for UKIP. Instead, vote intention polls reveal that UKIP performed consistently well between 2014 and the start of 2017, their reported vote share even increasing to over 15% in the summer of 2016.

A similar pattern is discernible at the end of the 2020 financial year. A significant rise in household disposable income from 2018 levels overlaps with Reform UK (then known as the Brexit Party) performing remarkably well in vote intention data, peaking at around 22% of the vote in July 2019.

One cannot, of course, discount the impact of the long tail of the 2008 financial crisis - arguably still with us to this day, but much more keenly felt a decade or so ago. Nor can economic performance - on whatever measure - be presented as the sole determinant of people’s voting behaviour: UKIP’s healthy position in the polls in 2014-16 coincided with the relative increase in salience of immigration, and then Europe, as political issues compared to the economy. Likewise, it seems reasonable to infer that Brexit, and its aftermath, was likely a key explanation behind the growth of the Brexit Party’s popularity.

Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS), released 2 May 2025, ONS website, statistical bulletin, Average household income, UK: financial year ending 2024.

Source: *Polling Average for UK General Election Voting Intention* (no date) *UK election data vault*. Available at: https://electiondatavault.co.uk/charts/polling-average/.

Nevertheless, on this measure the data does indicate that the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and support for the populist right is far from certain. As rising living standards in this period did not coincide with sinking poll numbers for the populist right, so the large fall in living standards between March 2022 and March 2023 appeared to have little effect on Reform’s vote share. Even in the following 6-month period, vote intention for Reform remained well under 10%, indicating that the party failed to substantially profit from this economic decline.

Again, the picture is more complicated than two metrics: Reform’s profile was much lower at this time, Nigel Farage wasn’t yet back on the scene. Still, whilst this initial look at the data is only brief, it does appear to suggest that delivering higher living standards - as measured by disposable income, at least - may not be a silver bullet for Labour in checking the rise of Reform.

Restoring trust in politics is imperative in combatting the populist right

Recent decades have seen a proliferation of work studying the relationship between trust in politics and support for populist parties, with many studies arguing that ‘the link from low political trust to support for populism is a well-established proposition’. Given that populist rhetoric is often centred on anti-establishment and anti-elite narratives, populist leaders are adept at utilising dissatisfaction with the existing political system to magnify their support.

There is substantial evidence supporting this argument. For example, Kessel illustrates that UKIP voters in the 2009 European Parliament election were ‘characterised by dissatisfaction with, and a lack of trust in, the political system’. Importantly, recent data have shown that political distrust can provide a ‘political opening for opportunistic politicians who promote alternative worldviews that may be at odds with sound economic policy’. Herrera and Trombetta illustrate that political distrust increases voter susceptibility to the simple alternative worldviews presented by populists, contending that the ‘lower voter’s trust in traditional politics the more likely they are to lose an election against populists’.

Despite acknowledging that ‘the fight for trust is the battle that defines our age’, Labour’s battle to restore trust is currently being lost and decisively so.

The most recent British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey revealed that levels of trust in politics have reached an all-time low, with this alarming trend fuelling the rise of the populist-right in the UK.

The report finds that ‘in contrast to previous elections, the 2024 contest did little to restore people’s trust and confidence in how they are being governed’. Immediately after the general election, the public’s confidence in the system of governance and in politicians changed very little, and after just a few months fell to record or near-record lows, with levels of trust ‘lower now than they have been after any previous election’.

Figure 3 illustrates responses to the question of how much individuals trust “British governments of any party to place the needs of the nation above the interests of their own political party”. It highlights the alarming trend of plummeting levels of trust, which the new Labour government has failed to reverse. Similarly, a shocking 5% trusted politicians to tell the truth when in a tight corner ‘just about always or most of the time’, whilst just under 60% ‘almost never’ do (Figure 4).

Importantly for Labour, the report finds that a lack of trust in politics is driving support for right-wing populism in the UK. It notes that individuals with ‘low levels of trust and confidence were markedly more likely to vote for Reform’, arguing that the extremely low levels of trust and satisfaction have pushed the combined vote share of the Conservatives and Labour to a historic low. Their findings reveal that nearly a quarter of those who ‘‘almost never’ trust governments to put the country’s interests before party voted for Reform – compared with just 5% of those who trust governments “just about always” or “most of the time”’. The same dynamic applies - by an almost identical ratio (26% to 5%) - to voters’ relative confidence in the system of governing Britain, overall found to be ‘at a historic low’. This highlights the importance of restoring trust in politics and political institutions, and its potentially significant impact on pulling back disillusioned voters who have been driven towards the populist right.

Source: Clery, E., Curtice, J. and Jessop, C. (eds.) (2025) British Social Attitudes: The 42nd Report. London: National Centre for Social Research. Available at: https://natcen.ac.uk/publications/bsa-42-britains-democracy.
Note: data is not recorded annually.

A comparison of levels of political trust and electoral support for right-wing populist parties in the UK over the past decade gives some support to the assertion that restoring trust in politics is crucial to arresting the growth in Reform’s poll numbers.

On one reading, Figures 2, 3 and 4 suggest a fairly strong, negative correlation between levels of trust and the performance of UKIP and Reform UK over the past ten years. For example, 2019 saw a drop in political trust (with only 15% trusting the government to put country before party ‘just about always or most of the time’). Simultaneously, vote intention data (laid out in Figure 2) revealed a huge increase in support for Reform UK (Brexit Party) over the summer of 2019, reaching an estimated 22% of the vote, whilst Conservative support plummeted to under 21%. In contrast, enhanced levels of trust between 2020 and 2021 occurred alongside practically non-existent levels of support for Britain’s populist right.

The BSA survey offers an explanation: trust in politics rose substantially among those who voted Leave in the EU referendum after Brexit was delivered by Boris Johnson’s Conservative government, having previously fallen among both Leavers and Remainers between 2016 and 2019.

Less clear is why the huge collapse in trust following Partygate (2021-23) did not discernibly benefit Reform. One possible reason has been alluded to previously - Reform’s profile then was nowhere near what it is now. As a result, Labour was the most obvious beneficiary of shifting voter preferences in this period. More research is needed to understand the exact relationship between levels of trust in politics and support for the populist right.

What is inarguable is that since then, very high- and rising- levels of distrust in politics have coincided with rapidly increasing support for Reform UK, whose intended vote share surpassed 20% by the end of 2024. Whilst we cannot interpret causation from this data (since it could be argued that populists themselves help to drive distrust in politics), these trends nonetheless expose the risk to this Labour government should trust in politics not improve.

Received political wisdom is that as an economy improves, so does voters’ faith in the system. Labour seems to hold to this view. (Incidentally, the lack of consistent, annual data regarding the level of trust in politicians and governments (since BSA has not recorded answers to these questions annually) obscures clear, longitudinal analysis of the relationship between political trust and fluctuating economic conditions. Further work in this area would be of great value.)

But even if improving living standards may - in the long-term - increase trust in politics and thus help to restore support for the incumbent government, this is a high-stakes bet. Labour must do more to restore trust in politics - and quickly. Fail to do so, and Farage’s increasing support may secure him victory at the next general election.

Conclusion: Labour must do more to repair trust in our fragile democracy

Evidence from both past research and historical data in the UK indicates that deliverism (notably improving standards of living) may not - as Starmer desperately hopes - boost Labour’s electoral prospects quickly enough and to a degree sufficient to impede the ascent of Reform UK.

Whilst it is not argued that macroeconomic outcomes are insignificant (nor is it denied that delivering good economic outcomes may be the best long-term strategy), Labour strategists cannot overlook the electoral risks threatened by failing to directly address growing political mistrust. Moreover, anticipated positive effects of improving standards of living are jeopardized by populist leaders’ ability to manipulate the objective economic context in order to fuel grievances and social conflict.

With the usual warning that correlation is not causation, a brief look at data from the UK over the past decade indicates that rising standards of living (measured by household disposable income) are no guarantee of preventing the success of the right-wing populist Reform UK. This claim is corroborated by the numerous examples of right-wing populist parties thriving under prosperous economic conditions. Further analysis is required to discern the potential causal relationships between economic conditions and support for right-wing populist parties.

While deliverism is no guarantee of brighter electoral prospects for Labour, failure to oversee improved levels of trust in politics is a near-certain recipe for defeat. Record low levels of trust in politics and confidence in the democratic system have fuelled support for Reform UK, who are now on track to be the largest party at the next UK election.

Real, fast change is required to prevent this eventuality. Labour must take seriously the large, and worrying shifts in public attitudes towards politics and the political system, and make rebuilding trust the keystone of its electoral strategy.

References:

Bauhr, M. et al. (2021) ‘Trust, Populism, and the Quality of Government’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Quality of Government. [Online]. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, Incorporated.

Bentley, O. and Geiger, C. (2024) Six takeaways from Keir Starmer’s ‘plan for Change’, BBC News. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cn9gxvppxqpo (Accessed: 02 July 2025).

Cena, L., Roccato, M., & Russo, S. (2023). Relative deprivation, national GDP and right-wing populism: A multilevel, multinational study. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 33(1), 32–42. https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2636

Clery, E., Curtice, J. and Jessop, C. (eds.) (2025) British Social Attitudes: The 42nd Report. London: National Centre for Social Research. Available at: https://natcen.ac.uk/publications/bsa-42-britains-democracy (Accessed: 03 July 2025).

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